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Using the GMM estimator, this paper empirically studies the bank-specific, industry specific and 
macroeconomics specific determinants of non-performing loans of banks in the South Asian countries 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan) for the period of 1997-2012. We found that moral hazard problems 
between the bank management and the depositors in addition to that between the bank management and the 
shareholders; and the adverse selection of borrowers by the bank significantly affect the bank credit risk. We 
also found evidence that bad management, cost inefficiency, income diversification, bank size, industry 
concentration ratio, inflation and GDP growth rate all significantly explain the levels of bank NPLs. Empirical 
results show a moderate degree of  persistence of NPLs and a late-hit of the global financial crisis in the 
banking sector of the region.  
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Prolonged existence of non-performing loans (NPL) in the bank balance sheet causes the 
severe bank management problems as it not only deteriorate the asset quality of the bank but also 
reduce its earning and moral hazard problems between the bank and its funding channels mostly 
attributed to the depositors. On the other hand, high levels of NPL in the economy also signal the 
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bankruptcy possibilities of the borrowers resulting the worsening of business environment and 
economic conditions of a country. Due to rapid globalization and financial liberalization, the role 
of banks’ in the economic development of a country increased in many folds. But the problems 
of non-performing loans saddle a bank and cause the prolonged economic stagnation of a country 
or even the global financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) pointed that NPL can be 
instrumented as the signal of banking crisis. Hence, this area of research of the problems and the 
determinants of non-performing loans of banks is equally and in increased importance to the 
academics and the researchers in present and as it was in the past. Understanding the factors 
determining the NPLs and solving for those is important to the bank management and the 
regulatory bodies in order to apposite functioning of the bank and to rehabilitate the economy.   
Over the past decades, majority of the research on the determinants of non-performing 
loans viewed NPLs as the functions of macroeconomic and bank specific determinants. 
Macroeconomic views of the determinants of NPL focus primarily on the macro-prudential 
factors. Fundamentals of the theoretical relationships between the NPL and the macroeconomic 
factors can be found in the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG, 1998) framework of ‘financial 
acceleration’ and later expansion by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) where credit market is pro-
cyclical and the role of asymmetric information and frictions affect the credit market. Rinaldi 
and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) found household disposable income; unemployment and monetary 
conditions have strong relationship with non-performing loans in the European Union banking.  
Literature of the microeconomic determinants of non-performing loans emphasizes on the 
bank-specific factors. Berger and DeYoung (1997) analyzed the Granger-causality relationship 
between the NPLs and his so called ‘bad luck’, ‘bad management’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral hazard, 
where the empirical variables were cost efficiency and the capital adequacy. Among others, 
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Williams (2004) followed the Berger and DeYoung hypotheses and came out the same kind of 
relationship in the European banking.  
Salas and Saurina (2002) studies of Spanish banking during 1985 to 1997, found that 
along with macroeconomic factors the bank specific variables also explain the future changes in 
NPLs of banks.  Similar strand of literature include Louzis et al. (2012), who studies the 
determinants of NPL in Greek banking. However, no single study was out of criticism due to 
insufficiently selection of variables or failure to implement the appropriate econometric 
methodology (Athanasoglu, 2008).  
We study the determinants of bank non-performing loans as a function of macroeconomic 
factors, industry specific factors and the bank specific factors using the Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimator for the panel data of 259 banks in the South Asian countries 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan) for 1997 to 2012. 
This paper will be interesting to the concern researchers, readers, management personnel 
and the policy makers as we showed that ‘adverse selection’ of borrowers by the bank in case of 
credit selection causes higher non-performing loans. We found the individual bank’s lending rate 
positively affect the bad loan ratio not the macroeconomic policy rates. Charging higher rates, 
bank set aside the safe side borrowers as they cannot afford and create rooms for the borrowers 
whose business type is high-risk high-return; that could result the higher non-performing loans. 
This study empirically showed that in addition to the Berger and DeYoung’s (1997) 
‘moral hazard’ hypothesis between the shareholders and the bank management; another ‘moral 
hazard II’ between the depositors and the bank management also affect the credit quality of a 
bank. We showed that when a bank having excess liquidity, its management feels the cost of 
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liquidity burden and disburse loans and advances without proper screening and ultimately 
mounting the higher ratio of non-performing loans. In other words, depositors, as a third party 
cannot monitor the cost of excess liquidity but facing the moral hazard problems as a result of 
bad loans contracts. 
The sample selection for this study was also notable on the ground that most of our 
sample countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) were under the rule of British colony for 
around two hundred years. We got the opportunity to study those countries’ banking systems all 
–together considering likely regulatory, social and economic environments. In the near past we 
found similar studies on developed and developing countries of America, Europe, and Asia but 
in case of South Asia, this study is a unique addition to the literature of the determinants of bank 
non-performing loans. 
For the rest of the paper, we organized as follows: in section 2, we presented relevant 
literature on the determinants of bank non-performing loans. In section 3 the empirical approach 
of our study and in section 4 the sample description has been outlined. In section 5 the result and 
finally in section 6 we presented the conclusion and policy implications of our study.   
 
2. The literature of the determinants of non-performing loans  
 
The literature in the past viewed the determinants of bank non-performing loans (NPL) as 
a function of bank specific and macroeconomic factors. The bank specific factors may be termed 
as the microeconomic variables and can be directly found in the financial statements of a bank.  
On the other hand, the macroeconomic variables are the overall economic, regulatory and legal 
environment within which a bank operates its business.  Extensive literature review found the 
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three streams of literature on the determinants of non-performing loans are macroeconomic 
stream, microeconomic stream and the synthesis of macro and microeconomic stream. 
Studies on the macroeconomic determinants of non-performing loans focus on the 
external events such as the overall macroeconomic conditions, which are likely to affect the 
borrowers’ capacity to repay their loans. The classical literature studying the interactions 
between the macroeconomic environment and financial fundamentals are the models developed 
by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (KM, 1997), Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (BGG, 1998) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (GK, 2011). BGG (1998) developed the 
framework of ‘financial accelerator’ where credit markets are pro-cyclical and the role of 
asymmetric information between the borrowers and lenders affect the credit market shocks 
whereas KM (1997) and GK (2011) models allow the business cycle fluctuations and the role of 
frictions in case of credit market imperfections, respectively. 
Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) studied the macroeconomic determinants of the 
non-performing loans of 7 European Union countries and found strong relationship between the 
credit risk and the household disposable income, rate of unemployment and the monetary 
conditions of a country. Ali and Daly (2010) investigated that the same set of macroeconomic 
conditions affect the default rates of Australia and the US banking differently but the later one 
found to be more sensitive. The problem of NPL found to be positive to the increase in the 
nominal interest rates and the number of bankruptcies and negative to the higher CPI inflation, 




Bohachova (2008) found the pro-cyclical nature of default risk where the banks 
accumulate risks more rapidly in economically good times and some of these risks materialize as 
asset quality deterioration during recessions in the OECD countries. In the same line, Nkusu 
(2011) empirically studied the panel of 26 advanced economies and found that macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities deteriorate the credit portfolios of banks. Espinoza and Prasad (2010), in their 
dynamic panel estimates over 1995-2008 period of GCC countries showed the persistence of 
non-performing loans and the inverse relationship with economic growth and the interest rates. 
Castro (2013) employed dynamic panel data approach to study the macroeconomic determinants 
of credit risk in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (GIPSI) and found that credit risk is 
negatively affected by the GDP growth rate and the share and housing price indices but 
positively affected by the unemployment rate, interest rate, credit growth and an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. Skarica (2014) found the primary cause of high levels of NPL is the 
economic slowdown and deterioration in the state of employment and inflation in the seven 
central and Eastern European countries in the period of Q:3 2007 and Q:3 2012. 
Group of literature on microeconomic determinants of non-performing loans were 
interested more at the variability of NPL across banks attributes to the bank level factors. Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) evidenced the four mutually non-exclusive two-way causalities over the 
default risk in their studies of the US commercial banks during the period of 1985-94. They 
found that ‘bad luck’, ‘bad management’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral hazard’ could affect the same 
bank at the same time. They argued that, bad luck could befall a poorly managed bank that also 
happens to be skimping on loan monitoring costs and for any loss of capital due to these factors, 
banks respond to moral hazard incentives and take increased risks. Williams (2004), Podpiera 
and Weil (2008) and Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2010) studies follow the Berger and 
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DeYoung (1997) hypotheses and came out with same kind of results who studied the European 
savings banks, Czech banks and Greek banking sectors for different time periods, respectively. 
Keeton and Morris (1987) found that banks taking higher risk including in the form of 
excess lending eventually incur greater losses. In a comparative study of the credit risk 
determinants of banks in the developed and the emerging economies, Ahmad and Ariff (2007) 
found that regulatory capital and the management quality significantly determine banks credit 
portfolios. 
As the synthesis of macroeconomic and the microeconomic determinants of non-
performing loans, Salas and Saurina (2002), using the GMM estimation technique for the panel 
data from 1985-1997 of Spanish commercial and savings banks found that GDP growth rate, 
firm and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio 
composition, size, net interest margins, capital ratio and the market power significantly affect the 
credit risk of a bank.  In a similar kind of study, Louzis et al. (2012) found that along with GDP 
growth rate and unemployment rate, inefficiency and performance indicators also greatly explain 
the credit problems of Greek banking sector. Rajan and Dahl (2003) found the terms of credit 
and macroeconomic and business conditions affect the NPLs in the Indian banking. Festic and 
Repina (2011) studied the five EU countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
and found that macroeconomic slowdown and skimping on loan supervision are important for 
the deterioration of credit quality. 
Among others Zribi and Boujelbene (2011) concluded that the macro prudential policies 
and the regulatory capital and ownership structure significantly affect the NPL of Tunisian banks.  
Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) studied the French and German banking sector and found a set of 
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macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, interest rate, unemployment and exchange rate along 
with the bank specific variables like loan loss provisions, inefficiency and the firm size affect the 
non-performing loans ratio of the banks. 
This study focuses on the synthesis of the macroeconomic and the bank specific 
determinants of non-performing loans of banks in the South Asian countries. We extended the 
literature of the determinants of non-performing loans by empirically showing that instead of 
macroeconomic policy rates, the individual bank’s lending rate and the information asymmetry 
between the depositors and the bank is prominently determine the NPL. In this study, the panel 
data of 259 commercial banks for the period of 1997-2012 which is relatively large that we 
studied empirically will allow the better insight into the factors determining the banking credit 
risk. 
 
3.  Empirical Approach of the determinants of non-performing loans study 
3.1. Econometric Model 
 
We viewed the determinants of non-performing loans (NPL) of banks as the function of 
bank-specific, industry specific and the macroeconomic specific variables and the general model 
to be estimated is of the following linear form: 
𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝐜𝐜 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐣𝐣𝐉𝐉
𝐣𝐣=𝟎𝟎 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐥𝐥𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐥𝐥𝐍𝐍
𝐥𝐥=𝟎𝟎 + ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐦𝐦𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐦𝐦𝐌𝐌𝐦𝐦=𝟎𝟎 + 𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢  




Where, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the ratio of non-performing loans of bank i at time t where i = 1,.....,N, t = 1,....., 
T and c is a constant term. The superscripts j, l and m of  Xit  denote the bank-specific, industry 
specific and macroeconomic specific determinants respectively.  εit is the disturbance with  νi the 
unobserved bank-specific effect and υit  the idiosyncratic error. The error components of the 
regression model also distributed as νi ~IIN (0, σν2 ) and independent of υit ~ IIN (0, συ2 ).  
We adopted a dynamic specification of a model that includes a lagged dependent variable in the 
right hand side among the regressors to account for the time persistence in the NPL structure 
following the recent literature in panel data studies (see, Salas and Saurina, 2002, Louzis et al., 
2012). The dynamic specification model of the determinants of non-performing loan is: 
𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝐜𝐜 +  𝛅𝛅𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢−𝟏𝟏 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐣𝐣𝐉𝐉
𝐣𝐣=𝟎𝟎 + ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐥𝐥𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐥𝐥𝐍𝐍
𝐥𝐥=𝟎𝟎 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐦𝐦𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐦𝐦𝐌𝐌𝐦𝐦=𝟎𝟎 +  𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢         ..Equation (2) 
 
Where, NPLi,t−1 is the one-period lag of non-performing loans and δ is the speed of adjustment 
to the equilibrium. A value of 0 < δ < 1 implies the persistence of NPL in the industry but tends 
to return to the normality level. 
Literature usually applies the fixed effects (FE) or the random effects (RE) modeling in static 
type of relationships but in dynamic relationships these models produce biased (especially when 
time dimension T gets smaller) and inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Thus we precede 
the following five step issues for the econometric model of NPL determinants. 
Firstly, we tested our data for non- stationarity using the Fisher test which does not require a 
panel to be balanced. This test is a question when the use of a relatively large T in a model of 
non-performing loans may be criticized on grounds of non-stationarity.   The null of non-
stationarity has been rejected at 1% level at every level.  
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Secondly, we examined whether the individual effects are fixed or random. The relevant 
Hausman test for equation 1 confirms the evidence in favor of a FE modeling 2. Also the 
estimation result confirms the existence of individual effect since the F-statistics is significant (F 
(126, 687) = 15.11, Prob > F = 0.0000). However, the least square (within) estimator of the FE 
model in the presence of a lagged dependent variable among regressors is both biased and 
inconsistent3. 
Thirdly, we proceed with the estimation of our model using the one step generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) paradigm which suggest that 
consistency and efficiency gains can be obtained by using all available lagged values of the 
dependent variable along with the exogenous regressors as instruments.  
Fourthly, we dealt with the problem of endogenuity with estimation of bank non-performing loan. 
The question is whether capital variable (E/TA) is endogenous or not. To confirm such, we ran 
the same model twice separately. First time we treated capital variable as strictly exogenous and 
second time as endogenous.   Sargan test 4 for over-identifying restrictions indicates that no 
endogenuity assumption is valid for capital variable in NPL modeling and we treated capital 
variable as strictly exogenous.  
 
                                                          
2 The relevant Hausman test chi-squared statistics was  𝜒𝜒2(11 ) = 3905.20 with p-value is 0.0000 
 
3  The Monte Carlo studies that measured the corresponding bias in the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables have found that the bias is significant for small values of T but goes to zero as T 
increases (see Judson and Owen, 1999). 
4 In both the cases ρ = 0.00 which means the question of endogenuity is irrelevant for capital variable in 
NPL modeling.  
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Finally, we addressed the unobserved time effects in the error components of our model as 
follows: 
𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝐜𝐜 + 𝛅𝛅𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢−𝟏𝟏 + ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐣𝐣𝐉𝐉
𝐣𝐣=𝟎𝟎 + ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐥𝐥𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐥𝐥𝐍𝐍
𝐥𝐥=𝟎𝟎 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐦𝐦𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐦𝐦𝐌𝐌𝐦𝐦=𝟎𝟎 +  𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢    
𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰𝐰,  𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝛎𝛎𝐢𝐢 +  𝛌𝛌𝐢𝐢 + 𝛖𝛖𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 ......Equation (3) 
   
Where λt is the unobservable time effect and we tested the joint significance of time effects as 
𝑯𝑯𝟎𝟎 =  𝝀𝝀𝟐𝟐 =  𝝀𝝀𝟑𝟑 =  𝝀𝝀𝑻𝑻 = 𝟎𝟎.  The relevant LM test5 approves the inclusion of time dummies. We 
experimented for time dummies for all years jointly and separately but found the year dummies 
2003, 2009 and 2010 are significant. Considering all these, we estimated the determinants of 
non-performing loans by the following dynamic equation: 
𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 = 𝐜𝐜 +  𝛅𝛅𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢−𝟏𝟏 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐣𝐣𝐉𝐉
𝐣𝐣=𝟎𝟎 +  ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐥𝐥𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢
𝐥𝐥𝐍𝐍
𝐥𝐥=𝟎𝟎 + ∑ 𝛃𝛃𝐦𝐦𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐦𝐦𝐌𝐌𝐦𝐦=𝟎𝟎 + 𝛄𝛄𝛄𝛄𝟎𝟎𝟑𝟑 + 𝛄𝛄𝛄𝛄𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎 +  𝛄𝛄𝛄𝛄𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎 +  𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢      










                                                          




3.2. Empirical determinants of non-performing loans of banks 
 
For this empirical study of  the econometric model of the determinants of non-performing 
loan developed in section 3.1, we have used 3 categories of proxy variables namely (a) firm 
specific, (b) industry specific and (c) macroeconomic specific (see table-1 for a summary of 
these variables). 
3.2.1. The dependent variables  
Non-performing loan ratio 
We used the ratio of nonperforming loan to total loan (NPL/TL) as the dependent 
variable in our model. By non-performing loans, we mean the volume of impaired loans and by 
definition, a loan is impaired when, based on current information and events, it is probable that a 
creditor will be unable to collect all amounts due according to the contractual terms of the loan 
agreement (see FASB, 2008). Alternatively, this ratio has been used to proxy the credit risk 
measures in many of the past literature (see V. Castro, 2013, B. Imbierowicz et. al., 2014). 
 
3.2.2. The explanatory variables 
(a) Bank-specific explanatory variables 
 
(i) Return on assets  
We used return on average assets (ROA) as the proxy for the bank performance which 
negatively influences the levels of non-performing loans of a bank. Past performance can reflect 






(ii) Equity to Total Assets ratio 
 
The ratio of equity to total assets measures the capitalization strength of a bank considering 
the regulatory requirements regarding the minimum equity holdings. Anticipating impact of this 
variable on bank non-performing loan is negative as low financial capital will cause high non-
performing loan (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). To address the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis, when 
third party is bearing the risk of the excessive risk taking cost of another party but cannot easily 
be charge for or prevent that risk taking behavior of the bank, we expect equity to total assets 
ratio will significantly affect bank non-performing loan ratio. 
 
(iii) Cost to income ratio 
Cost to total income ratio is the proxy for inefficiency variable and we expect statistically 
significant and negative relationship to the non-performing loan. Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
examined different intertemporal relationships of this measured cost efficiency/inefficiency and 
those subsequently affect the non-performing loan of a bank. In their so called ‘bad luck’ 
hypothesis, increases in problem loans due to exogenous effects precede the decreases in 
measured cost efficiency whereas in ‘bad management’ hypothesis have the opposite temporal 
order where low measured cost efficiency occur before causing higher problem loans.  On the 
other hand, according to their ‘skimping’ hypothesis, when management chose short run cost 
efficiency in exchange of long run profitability will experience the mounting of non-performing 





(iv) Bank size 
Bank size has been measured in terms of natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets and 
assumed the predictive capacity of this variable is negative over NPL under the ‘diversification’ 
hypothesis where the theoretical argument that larger banks are mostly diversified to manage 
their loan portfolio and ‘bad’ borrowers (Zribi and Boujelbene, 2011).  
(v) Off-balance sheet income  
Banking business has been diversified many folds now a day. Following Louzis et. al. (2012), 
we examined the effect of off-balance sheet income on NPL and expect a statistically significant 
negative relationship. The net non-interest income (non interest expense less non-interest 
income) over total assets (NNII/TA) has been taken as the proxy for the off-balance sheet 
income and expects positive impact of this variable on non-performing loans.  
(vi) Liquidity ratio 
Higher liquidity ratio reduces the liquidity risk of a bank and fosters the ability of the 
management for loan servicing and monitoring that result the lower levels of non-performing 
loan. On the other hand, excess liquidity is a good proxy of moral hazard problems between the 
bank management and the depositors because they cannot monitor and make the management 
bound for effective utilization of the fund. We calculated the liquidity ratio (LA/D&STF) as the 
liquid assets of a bank over the deposits and short term funding in percentage form and expect a 






(vii) Growth rate of total loan 
 
One of the fundamentals of bank management is loan management which is directly related 
to the quality control of the credit disburse. By increasing the volume of loans, management may 
try to offset or reduce the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. We expect the growth of 
total loan will significantly reduce the non-performing loan ratio of a bank.  
 
(viii) Interest income to total loan ratio 
We introduced the ratio of interest income to total loan as the proxy for the lending rate of a 
bank and how this affects the credit quality of its balance sheet. The intuition of such 
introduction was to compare the predictive nature of the individual lending rate and the 
macroeconomic policy rates. Again, higher individual bank lending rate will invite the risky 
borrowers whose business type is high risk- high return type because the safe side customers 
may not afford the higher cost of loans. In that sense, we may assume that due to the adverse 
selection of borrowers by the bank is one of the main reasons of higher non-performing loans. 
Our hypothesis is the higher the lending rate; the higher will be the default risk as such rate 
deteriorates the borrowers’ ability and also the willingness to repay the loan. 
 
(b). Industry-specific variables 
(ix) Concentration ratio 
Concentration ratio (CR3) is the proxy variable for the market concentration and its impact 
on bank non-performing loan in our empirical study. This is a common and widely used measure 
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of market concentration where higher concentration means lower competition and vice versa and 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of total assets of largest three (3)   banks to that of the industry.  
According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, banks in highly concentrated 
markets earn monopoly rents, because they tend to collude (Gilbert, 1984) and thus deteriorate 
the market competition. We expect the negative influence of higher concentration on NPL 
because in absence of perfectly competitive market scenario, borrowers may feel reluctant to 
repay the loans. 
 
(c). Macroeconomic-specific variables 
(x) Standard deviation of short term interest rate 
As the proxy for the short term lending rate, we used the annualized standard deviation of 
monthly average of daily call money rates (SDint) and expect the positive relationship with the 
non-performing loan ratio of a bank.  
(xi) Term spread of interest rate  
Term spread of interest rate is the proxy variable for the long term interest rate in our present 
study. We used the difference of yield spread of 10 year and 5 year treasury bonds as the proxy 
of term structure of interest rate (R) and its impact on the bank non-performing loan ratio. 
Previous literature (see Castro, 2013, Nkusu, 2011) emphasized the impact of long term interest 
rate on the problem loan of a bank. An increase in the lending rate simultaneously weakens the 
debt servicing capabilities of a borrower hence we expect positive relationship with NPL of a 




(xii) GDP growth rate  
Stable Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate represents the stability of an economy and 
thus affect the demand and supply of loans and deposits directly. We assume that as GDP growth 
ensures the stability of the economy and in that stable economic environment a borrowers’ 
business risk reduces significantly and increases the ability of debt servicing (Salas and Saurina, 
2002).  We expect statistically significant inverse relationship with GDP growth and non-
performing loan of a bank. 
(xiii) Rate of inflation  
The effect of inflation on the non-performing loan ratio of a bank is not deterministic in the 
past literature. Theoretically, inflation should reduce the real value of debt and hence make debt 
servicing easier but also high inflation may pass through to nominal interest rates, reducing 
borrowers’ loan servicing capacity (B. Skarika, 2014). Although Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006) reported positive relationship, following Shu (2002), we expect inflation and NPL will 
have statistically significant inverse relationship. 
 
4. Sample and data  
 
In this research of the determinants of the non-performing loans of banks, we studied the 
unbalanced panel of 2596 South Asian banks over the period of 1997-2012. By banks we mean 
the financial intermediary who takes deposits and provide loans and advances in the ordinary 
courses of business. We excluded the data of Islamic banks from our sample as in India and 
                                                          
6 By countries, India represents 60% banks in our total sample while Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan represent 
12%, 10% and 18% respectively. 
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Nepal there is no or very limited Islamic banking operation. For our analyses, we collected data 
from various sources. The dependent variable and the bank specific explanatory variables, we 
collected data from the Bureau Van Dijk’s Bank Scope database (Bank Scope 2013) using the 
universal model of banking database. We took the primary data set from the Bank Scope but 
calculated by our own to get the concentration ratio (CR3) which we used as the industry specific 
explanatory variables. For macroeconomics specific variables, we collected data from two 
sources. We collected the data of short term money market rates7 and the term spread of interest 
rate8 from the central banks websites of the respective countries. From International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database (IFS 2014), we collected yearly data of rate of inflation and the growth 
rate of gross domestic product (GDP). 
In table-2 in the following the descriptive statistics of the empirical variables used in the 
present study has been presented. As we see in South Asia, the non-performing loan to total loan 
ratio was quiet high (more than 8%) in the studied period. 
Among other key indicators, ROA was around 1% and the cost to income ratio was more 
than 61%. Also the average equity to capital ratio was around 10% and the liquid assets to the 
deposit and short term funding 19.71% indicates the quiet level of solvency of the South Asian 
banks. Average rate of inflation was slightly higher than 7% and the South Asian nation’s GDP 
grew more than 6% on an average during the period. 
<Table-2> 
                                                          
7 We used the annualized standard deviation of monthly average of daily call money rates as the proxy of short 
term interest rates. 
8 Term structure of interest rate is proxied as the difference between the yields spread of 10 year and 5 year 
Treasury bonds (T-bond). Also for Nepal, we sampled the development bond yield as the equivalent to 5 year 
T-bond and the national savings certificates yield as equivalent to 10 year T-bond as they have no such 
classified maturity bonds. 
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5. Empirical results  
5.1. The baseline result 
 
Table-3 in the following presents the GMM regression output of equation 4 of the 
determinants of non-performing loans (NPL) of the banks in South Asia for the total sample 
period of 1997-2012. The first column of the table presents the name of the dependent and the 
deterministic variables including bank specific, industry specific and macroeconomic specific 
while each column of model 1, model 2 and model 3 presents the coefficient and standard error 
respectively.  
The Wald-test confirms the fine goodness of fit of our panel data set and the Sargan-test 
shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. According to the results of AB (AR1) test a 
negative first order autocorrelation exists but does not imply the inconsistency of the estimates. 
Inconsistency would imply if there is the second-order autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) but is rejected by AB (AR2) test subsequently. 
Empirical results show a moderate degree of persistence of non-performing loans in 
South Asian banking as the one-period lagged dependent variable (δ (one period lagged 
NPL/TL) = 0.38604) is statistically significant also justify the use of GMM dynamic panel 
estimation of our model. This level of persistence of NPL in the South Asian region seems 










The statistically significant negative coefficient of the performance variable (proxied by 
return on asset (ROA) implies the ‘bad management’ hypothesis where performance serves as a 
proxy for the quality of management and lowering the levels of non-performing loans.  
 
Results support the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis that low capitalized banks leads to an 
increase in non-performing loans. Statistically significant coefficient of capital variable (E/TA) 
indicates that for every 1 percent decrease in equity to total asset ratio would increase NPL by 
approximately 23 basis points. 
Empirical evidence found that ‘skimping hypothesis’ is also persists in the South Asian 
banking region. Short-run cost efficiency burgeon the future level of NPL. Our empirical results 
support the so called ‘diversification hypothesis’ in both proxied variables size (lnTA) and net 
non-interest income ratio (NNII/TA).  Statistically significant negative coefficients of both the 
deterministic variables predict that banks having the capabilities of income diversification in 
terms of size and other non-interest income will have low levels of non-performing loans. 
We found empirical evidence in favor of the ‘liquidity hypothesis’ that banks with no 
liquidity shortage become able to expand their loans and advances and can reduce the non-
performing loans ratio significantly. Numerically speaking, if a bank can increase the liquid 
assets to deposit and short term funding and subsequently increase the total loans by 1 
percentage point then the NPL is supposed to be reduced by 4 basis point.  
Also we empirically proved that in the South Asian banking, rather than macroeconomic 
policy rates, individual bank’s lending rate significantly determines its non-performing loan ratio. 
In model 1 of table-3, we included the individual bank lending rate as the determinant of NPL. 
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Whereas, in model 2 and model 3, we included the short term lending rate (proxy of which is the 
annualized standard deviation of monthly average of daily call money rates, SDint) and the long 
term interest rate/term spread of interest rate (proxied by the difference between the yields spread of 
10 year and 5 year Treasury bonds, R) as the determinants of NPL. Models outcome show, if the 
bank increases its lending rate by 1 percent then its NPL ratio goes up by 36 basis points which 
are statistically significant whereas the coefficients of the SDint and R are statistically 
insignificant. 
Industry factor is also a significant determinant of non-performing loans in South Asia. 
Our proxy variable concentration ratio (CR3) is statistically significant and having negative 
coefficient means the higher ratio of non-performing loan is significantly due to the lack of fare 
competition in the banking industry. 
As our hypothetical expectation, the systematic factors affect the non-performing loan 
ratio of individual bank inversely. GDP growth rate significantly reduces the NPL. Also the 
significant negative coefficient of inflation rate implies that higher inflation weakens the 
borrowers’ ability to debt service by reducing their real income and these findings are consistent 
to the previous literature (see Chaibi et al. 2015). 
Our empirical results also evidence that in the year of 2003, 2009 and 2010, the non-
performing loan was significantly high may be due to the hit of the global recession which was 






5.2. Robustness check 
In table-4 we presented the result of our empirical model of the determinants of non-
performing loans in South Asia using the fixed effect9 panel estimator as an alternative to the 
GMM estimator. 
However, we found no change in signs and no significant change in values of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables in the alternative estimator which confirm that our 
baseline GMM estimation output is robust and the coefficients of the estimation can be 




6. Conclusion and implications of the study  
We studied the cross-country panel data set with micro and macro level variables and 
present the empirical results on how bank specific, industry specific and macroeconomics 
specific factors affect the bank non-performing loans. We followed the single stage model of 
NPLs determinants for the empirical study that included four South Asian countries’ that is 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan banking sector data covering the period of 1997-2012. 
Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical analysis and significantly positive 
persistence of NPLs behavior in the sample region justify the use of GMM estimator, an up-to 
date econometric methodology that we effectively addressed the issues that profits show a 
tendency to persist over time, reflecting impediments to market competition, informational 
opacity and/or sensitivity to regional/macroeconomic shocks.  
                                                          
9  The Hausman test allows the null hypothesis that the individual effect and the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated, rejected in all the cases. 
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Among the bank specific determinants, statistically significant coefficients of the proxy 
variables support the Berger and DeYoung’s (1997) ‘bad management’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral 
hazard’ hypotheses and the Louzis et al. (2012) ‘diversification’ and ‘too big to fail’ hypotheses. 
The findings also support that ‘moral hazard II’ where the depositors are mainly affected and the 
‘adverse selection’ of borrowers by the banks are also significantly affect the level of non-
performing loans of a bank. Significantly negative coefficients of inflation and GDP growth rate 
reveal the ‘bad luck’ hypotheses of Berger and DeYoung (1997) where the external elements 
affect the mounting of NPLs. In case of South Asia, concentration ratio of banks still has some 
deterministic capacity of non-performing loans along with some adverse effect of the global 
financial crisis.  
For the policy implications, we suggest the banks to take appropriate actions to achieve 
cost efficiency and the excellence of management so to address the moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues to minimize the non-performing loans ratio. The policy makers should focus the 
macro prudential policies so that the bank level lending rate remains within justified range to 
reduce the credit risk problems of each bank. Hoping these initiatives will benefit the society as a 
whole.  
In this paper, we comprehensively addressed the question of how microeconomic and 
macroeconomic forces affect the non-performing loans of a bank. But studies on a number of 
additional explanatory variables like corporate tax rates, ownership structure, deposit insurance, 
rate of unemployment, and portfolio effect, those could not be tested due to limitation of data and 
the degrees of freedom or for the potential multicollinearty problem, would be tested as the 
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Table-1: Description of variables used in the study of non-performing loans of banks 
Variables Notation Description 
Expected  
effect 
Dependent variables    
Non-performing loan ratio NPL/TL 
Non-performing loan (%) over total loan is a proxy 
variable for credit quality or credit risk exposed to a bank 
 
Independent variables    
(a). Bank-specific variables 
Return on average 
assets ROA Net income over average total assets (%) 
- 
i. Equity to total 
assets ratio E/TA 
Equity to total assets ratio (%) is a measure of 
 capital adequacy of respective bank 
- 
ii. Cost to income ratio C/TI Total cost over total revenue (%) - 
iii. Bank size ln(TA) Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank - 
iv. Off-balance sheet 
income ratio NNII/TA Net non-interest income over total assets (%) 
- 
v. Liquidity ratio 
LA/D&S
TF 
Liquid asset to total deposits and short term funding ratio 
(%) express the liquidity position of a bank 
- 
vi. Growth of total loan GTL Annual growth rate (%) of loan - 
vii. Interest income to 
Total loan ratio i Total interest income over total loan (%) 
+ 
(b). Industry-specific variables 
viii. Concentration ratio CR3 
Sum of total assets of largest three banks over that of the 
industry 
- 
(c). Macroeconomic-specific variables 
ix. Standard deviation of 
short term interest rate SDint 
Annualized standard deviation of monthly average of daily 
call money rates 
+ 
x. Term spread  of 
interest rate R 
Difference between the yields spread of 10 year and 5 year 
Treasury bonds, R (%) 
+ 
xi. Rate of inflation %Inf Annual rate of inflation (%) - 













Table-2: Descriptive statistics of the variables of non-performing loans model 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variable 
   Non-performing loan ratio (NPL/TL) 8.3432 4.2800 10.4056 
Independent variables 
   Bank specific 
   Return on Average Assets (ROA) 0.9950 1.1450 3.3746 
Equity to Total Asset ratio (E/TA) 9.9883 7.0900 12.3831 
Cost to income ratio (C/TI) 61.2300 48.5100 53.5445 
Size (lnTA) 7.1870 7.1253 2.0547 
Net non-interest income ratio (NNII/TA) 0.8788 0.6945 3.3148 
Liquidity ratio (LA/D&STF) 19.7128 14.4250 28.8512 
Growth rate of total loan (GTL) 26.7537 19.7450 46.5776 
Interest income to total loan ratio (i) 12.4542 10.5900 19.9496 
Industry specific 
   Concentration ratio (CR3) 0.5598 0.5412 0.1798 
Macroeconomics specific 
   Short term interest rate (Sdint) 1.3430 0.9992 1.1464 
Term spread of interest rate (R) 1.0741 0.6000 1.2237 
GDP growth rate  6.1365 6.1800 2.2592 

























performing loan ratio (NPL/TL) Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Independent variables 
      Bank specific 
      One period lagged NPL/TL .38604*** 0.03275 .38268*** 0.03312 .2555*** 0.04235 
Return on Asset (ROAA) -.89498*** 0.08190 -.89981*** 0.08228 -.85744*** 0.08573 
Equity to Total Asset ratio (E/TA) -.22691*** 0.04090 -.22004*** 0.04128 -.25058*** 0.04735 
Cost to income ratio (C/TI) -.00558* 0.00300 -.00548* 0.00301 -0.00445 0.00310 
Size (lnTA) -2.588*** 0.27484 -2.6939*** 0.27950 -2.2267*** 0.37601 
Net non-interest income ratio 
(NNII/TA) -.22295* 0.13306 -.23793* 0.13396 0.04667 0.16507 
Liquidity ratio (LA/D&STF) -.04484*** 0.01200 -.04534*** 0.01216 -.03005** 0.01320 
Growth rate of total loan (GTL) -.04396*** 0.00597 -.04433*** 0.00631 -.04023*** 0.00690 
Interest income to total loan ratio (i) .36009*** 0.05069 .36556*** 0.05105 .29436*** 0.05846 
Industry specific 
      Concentration ratio (CR3) -2.4719*** 0.80702 -2.4921*** 0.82473 -2.604** 1.14280 
Macroeconomics specific 
      Short term interest rate (Sdint)     -0.04647 0.07552 -0.02061 0.08061 
Term spread of interest rate (R)     
 
  -0.0531 0.14793 
GDP growth rate  -.35605*** 0.04973 -.347*** 0.05090 -.23719*** 0.06644 
Rate of inflation  -.08256** 0.04103 -.07584* 0.04128 -.08165* 0.04657 
Year 2003 (Dummy) 1.3335*** 0.35420 1.287*** 0.36302 1.2001 0.93165 
Year 2009 (Dummy) .78418*** 0.23774 .73405*** 0.24331 .67239** 0.26626 
Year 2010 (Dummy) 1.5772*** 0.24039 1.5915*** 0.24644 1.4354*** 0.27692 
Intercept 29.078*** 2.48970 29.913*** 2.55090 26.69*** 3.36610 





 Wald test (p-value) χ2(15) =  
1675.96 0.0000 
χ2 (16) =   
1646.42 0.0000 
χ2 (17)  =  
462.37 0.0000 
Sargan test(p-value) χ2 (97) =  
432.55 0.0000 
χ2 (97) = 
425.98 0.0000 
 χ2 (84) = 
356.51 0.0000 
AB test AR(1)(p-value) z = -2.2202 0.0264 z = -2.2588  0.0239 z = -1.8947 0.0581 
AB test AR(2)(p-value) z = -2.0702 0.1257 z = -2.032 0.2076 z = -1.2372 0.2160 
 
Note: The table reports the regression output from GMM estimation of the determinants of non-performing 
loan of banks. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked 
with ***, **, and * respectively. Wald test shows the fine goodness of fit of the model while Sargan test is the 
test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer  to 





Table-4: Robustness check (Fixed effect estimator as an alternative to GMM estimator) of the 





Model3       
  
Dependent variable: Non-
performing loan ratio (NPL/TL) Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Independent variables 
      Bank specific 
      Return on Average Assets (ROA) -.29541** 0.11459 -.3269*** 0.11357 -.24456*** 0.0946 
Equity to Total Asset ratio (E/TA) -.17608*** 0.04761 -.17636*** 0.04745 -.47348*** 0.04425 
Cost to income ratio (C/TI) .02456*** 0.00564 .02502*** 0.00557 .01126** 0.0046 
Size (lnTA) -3.5787*** 0.33512 -3.6271*** 0.34529 -1.585*** 0.46202 
Net non-interest income ratio 
(NNII/TA) -1.4154*** 0.17854 -1.5544*** 0.18002 .42223** 0.20303 
Liquidity ratio (LA/D&STF) .03345* 0.01843 .03282* 0.01852 .02712* 0.0162 
Growth rate of total loan (GTL) -.04813*** 0.00688 -.06076*** 0.00807 -.03899*** 0.00684 
Interest income to total loan ratio (i) 0.12737* 0.08085 .14825* 0.08087 0.1046 0.07403 
Industry specific 
      Concentration ratio (CR3) -5.201*** 1.2007 -5.0306*** 1.1942 -4.5399*** 1.2959 
Macroeconomics specific 
      Short term interest rate (Sdint)     -.37423*** 0.13045 -.25632** 0.11137 
Term spread of interest rate (R)     
 
  -0.24544 0.17054 
GDP growth rate  -.40553*** 0.08368 -.40277*** 0.08552 -.19983** 0.08981 
Rate of inflation  -.28727*** 0.06852 -.26805*** 0.06887 -.21166*** 0.0596 
Year 2003 (Dummy) 1.2868* 0.67518 0.91775 0.67769 0.45174 1.2951 
Year 2009 (Dummy) 0.62774 0.45839 0.30917 0.46391 0.39496 0.39086 
Year 2010 (Dummy) 2.1735*** 0.45633 2.3779*** 0.45519 2.0481*** 0.41501 
Intercept 42.554*** 2.6669 43.63*** 2.7281 26.969*** 3.9521 
Number of observations 825   811   669   
R2 0.4713   0.4899   0.379   
Wald test (p-value) 
F (14, 684) 
= 43.55  0.0000 
F (15, 669) 
= 42.83  0.0000 
F(16, 526) 
= 20.06  0.0000 
Hausman test,  χ2 (p-value) 39.5.20  0.0000 1443.44  0.0000 123.82  0.0000 
 
Note: The table reports the regression output from Fixed Effect estimation of the determinants of NPL. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, **, 
and * respectively. Wald test is the test for the goodness of fit of the model while Hausman test confirm the 







Table-A5: Correlation matrix* of the variables studied for the model of the determinants of non-
performing loan of banks in South Asia 
Variables** npltl roa i eta ladstf cti lnta gtl nniita cr3 gdp inf ltint sdint  _cons  
                                
L.npltl 1                                      
roa 
-
0.1508 1                                    
i 0.3061 
-
0.2478 1                                  
eta 0.2795 
-





0.2717 -0.2112 1                              
cti -0.157 0.2829 0.1156 0.0562 0.0465 1                            
lnta 0.1036 0.001 
-







0.0769 -0.0181 0.074 0.0364 0.0339 1                        
nniita -0.144 0.3205 
-










0.0464 0.1476 -0.0639 0.0342 0.038 0.3403 
-









0.0882 -0.0452 -0.047 -0.1092 1                
ltint 
-




0.0425 -0.1188 0.1962 -0.2015 
-
0.3663 1              
sdint 0.0832 
-




0.0732 0.0784 0.0364 
-















* Output of Stata 
** Refer to the table-1 of summary statistics for elaboration of the names of the variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
